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EFFECTS OF BANS ON HEAVY LORRIES IN LONDON 
IMPACTS ON MANUFACTURING & SERVICE INDUSTRY 
by 
N. S. Patterson and A. D. May 
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the sponsors. 
Thte work w-m sponsored bs  the I n q u b  into the Effects 
of Bans on Heavw Lorries wtthtn London. 
Institute for Transport Studies. University of Leeds, Leeds LS2 9JT. England. Leeds (05321 31751 
ABSTRACT 
PATTERSON, N.S. and A.D. MAY (1980). Effects of bans on Heavy lorries 
in London: impacts on manufacturing and service industry. Leeds: 
University of Leeds, Inst. Transp. Stud., WP 159(unpublished). 
The report evaluates the extent to which representative samples of manu- 
facturing and service firms drawn from the inner and outer London areas of 
South Shoreditch and Brimsdown respectively would be affected by proposed 
bans on 16 ton and 24 ton GVW commercial vehicles within Greaker London.,! 
The proportion of commercial vehicle trips to and from South Shoreditch firms 
affected by the bans would be low and one-quarter of the firms would be 
affected by a 16 ton G W  ban. One in five trips to and from Brimsdown firms 
is currently made by a vehicle in excess of 16 ton GVW, and two-thirds of 
the sample of firms would be affected. The majority of affected movements 
are by suppliers' vehicles rather than firms' own fleets. 
Three firms particularly likely to be affected were examined in more detail, 
and the implications of their changing to lighter vehicles investigated. 
A weight-specific 16 ton GVW ban would impose annual operating cost increases 
on all firms if they were to maintain existing levels of service with their 
own vehicle fleets. Under a 24 ton GVW ban two firms would incur cost 
increases while, for the operations considered, there would be a saving in 
annual operating costs for the third. The assumption that regulations 
governing vehicle dimensions and carrying capacity remain unaltered is 
crucial to the conclusions. 
Night time 16 ton and 24 ton GVW bans would affect a minority of firms, 
although the duration of the ban would be important. .Weekend bans would not 
significantly affect the firms. 
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EFFECTS OF BANS ON HEAVY LORRIES I N  LONDON 
IMPACTS ON MANUFACTURING AND SERVICE INDUSTRY 
1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 In  t he  autumn of 1981 the  Greater London Council appointed a Panel 
of Inquiry whose terms of reference were: 
11 t o  examine the  social ,  economic and environmental effects  of 
banning heavy l o r r i e s  within a c i rcu la r  route on or  near t h e  
administrative boundary of Greater London, t he  examination 
t o  include:- 
The banning of such l o r r i e s  from the  area a t  all times; and 
the  banning of such l o r r i e s  from the  area a t  night-time 
and a t  weekends as an interim or  permanent measure; 
t o  examine the  p rac t i ca l i t i e s  of enforcement of any such ban; 
and t o  report  ." 
In  defining heavy l o r r i e s ,  it was decided t o  consider 
a )  a ban on l o r r i e s  whose gross vehicle weight exceeds 16 tons 
b )  a ban on l o r r i e s  whose gross vehicle weight exceeds 24 tons. 
1.2 A t  an ear ly  stage the  Panel sought the  advice of t h e  public and 
interested organisations on a number of questions, amongst which 
were several  re la ted  t o  t he  impacts o f t h e  various possible bans on 
the  costs and operation of f re ight  movement: 
I f  a full-time ban i s  imposed generally upon vehicles i n  excess 
of 8" tons gvw, would there  be any haulage functions which could 
not be carr ied out a t  a l l  within London? If so which? Are 
there  any haulage functions which would be fac i l i t a ted7  
I f  t he  ban re la ted  t o  vehicles i n  excess of 16 tons gvw or 24 
tons gvw what would the  answer be? 
-. , 
H 
The poss ib i l i ty  of a 8 ton ban was l a t e r  omitted from t he  panel's 
considerations. 
For loads which would be transported by other means, what 
a l te rna t ive  methods of transportation would be used? Would 
operators be l i k e l y  t o  tu rn  t o  t he  use of smaller vehicles, 
or  other t ransport  media? How effect ive would such al ternat ives  
be? 
What would be the net effect  on cost of complying with any 
such ban? What is  t h e  proper method of calculating changes in 
costs? 
How would t h i s  cost be expressed for:- 
i) haul iers  operating for  h i r e  and reward 
ii) firms receiving o r  sending goods 
iii) own-account operators employing t h e i r  own vehicles? 
1.3 A t  t h e  time of t he  commencement of t he  Inquiry the  I n s t i t u t e  f o r  
Transport Studies had recently completed a study for  t he  Department 
of Transport on t h e  transport  problems of inner c i t y  firms, which 
had included detai led case studies of 19 firms i n  t h e  manufacturing 
and service industr ies  i n  South Shoreditch (L.B. Hackney) and 19 
i n  Brimsdown (L.B. ~ n f i e l d )  . Surveys a t  each firm were concerned 
with identifying the  types of problems affect ing such firms, and t h e i r  
e f fec t s  and costs.  They included interviews with management and 
commercial vehicle dr ivers ,  questionnaires of employees and v i s i t o r s ,  
and surveys of parking and commercial vehicle movement. Different 
s izes  of comerc ia l  vehicle were separately iden t i f ied ,  and 
information on or igin ,  comodity and frequency of v i s i t  obtained. 
1.4 While t he  survey method was c lear ly  not designed specif ical ly  with 
heavy lo r ry  bans i n  mind, t he  data collected provided a useful ins ight  
in to  the extent t o  which a representative cross section of indus t r ia l  
firms i n  two very different  areas of London would be affected. The 
Inquiry Panel therefore commissioned the I n s t i t u t e  
' t o  study and report on the  effects on firms . . . of a ban 
on the  operation of heavy l o r r i e s  (of over 16 tons o r  over 24 
tons)  within London . . ., t he  e f fec t s  . . . t o  include, so 
-. . 
f a r  as  is  prac t ica l ,  changes t o  t he  f l e e t  of l o r r i e s ,  changed 
d is t r ibu t ion  patterns,  cap i ta l  and operating costs  of t he  
changes'. 
1 .5  While recognising tha t  many of t he  or iginal  38 firms had too small a 
l eve l  of heavy lo r ry  use t o  jus t i% fur ther  examination, t he  Panel 
l a t e r  ins t ructed t h e  I n s t i t u t e  t o  carry out fur ther  interviews with 
three o r  four firms t o  obtain t he  fur ther  information necessary t o  
assess t he  rescheduling and cost implications of t h e  proposed bans. 
1.6 This report  presents t he  r e su l t s  of t h i s  investigation.  Section 2 
reviews the  information already collected i n  t he  e a r l i e r  study, and 
draws conclusions based solely on t h i s  data. Section 3 out l ines  
t he  approach adopted i n  obtaining fur ther  information from three 
selected firms. Sections 4 t o  6 present case s tudies  of each firm 
i n  turn,  and Section 7 presents the  conclusions of t he  investigation. 
2. DATA FROM THE INNER CITIES STUDY 
2.1 BACKGROUND 
Data obtained from management and on s i t e  surveys of manufacturing and 
associated service firms i n  each of South Shoreditch and Brimsdown have 
been u s e d t o  determine the  transport  aspects of t h e  firms' operations 
and those f i r m s  which would be affected by the proposed heavy lo r ry  
bans. Details  of t he  study areas and the samples of firms a re  
discussed elsewhereK, where it i s  demonstratedthat t he  samples a r e  
representative of t he  type of industry i n  t h e i r  respective study 
areas. 
Commercial vehicles have been grouped in to  f ive  categories,  type A 
t o  type E, on t h e  basis  of plated gross weight (Appendix I ) .  Those 
vehicles affected by the proposed bans are:- 
Type D : 1 6  - 24 tons plated gross weight. 
Type E : 24 + tons plated gross weight. 
-. . 
* Working Paper 145 of t he  I n s t i t u t e  for  Transport Studies. 
This section describes t he  character is t ics  of t he  firms' own 
vehicle f l e e t s ,  and of commercial vehicle a c t i v i t y  recorded a t  each 
firm during one working day*. mose fims which would be affected 
by the proposed bans are  identifiedK*. 
2.2 VEHICLE FLEETS 
The number of commercial vehicles owned (or  on long term h i r e  or  
l ease)  and based a t  t he  firms' premises are  shown i n  Table 1. Table 
2 indicates the  composition of firms' vehicle f l e e t s ,  and compares 
these with data  f romthe  GLTS. 
Table 1. FIRM'S VEHICLE FLEETS : NUMBERS OF VEHICLES 
No. of commercid vehicles i n  
firms' f l e e t ,  and based South Shoreditch Brimsdown 
a t  premises: 
0 
1-4 
5-10 
10+ 
not spec. 
Total 
3 1 
10 8 
3' 4 
la@ 58@@ 
2 1 
- - 
19 firms 19 firms 
* Surveys were carr ied out during May - July 1980. 
** Because of confident ia l i ty  requirements firms are  iden t i f ied  by number 
Only. Firms 25 - 44 a re  i n  South Shoreditch and 45 - 64 i n  Brimsdown. 
One of which (firm 44) owned 2 type E vehicles. 
Firm 42 owned 31 type ~-"roundsman" vehicles. 
'Ia One of which (firm 47) owned 7 type D and 2 type E vehicles,  and a 
fur ther  7 type D t r a i l e r s .  
Table 2. FIRMS' VEHICLE FLEET : COMPOSITION ( % )  
Vehicle South South Brimsdown LondonH* 
Type ( % )  Shoreditch Shoreditch (1971 GLTS) 
excl. firm 
42" 
A 58.1 27.9 17.4 
B 20.3 34.9 28.1 41.2 
C 18.9 32.5 47.0 C 37.4 
D o o 5.8 D 13.2 
E 2.7 4.7 1.7 E 8.2 
Tot a1  100% 100% 100% 100% 
* Firm 42 owned 31 type A "roundsman" vehicles. 
** GLTS data reported i n  TRRL ~R465. 
2.3 COMMENT - VEHICLE FLEETS 
( i )  There are  r e l a t i ve ly  few vehicles owned by the  firms which were 
surveyed. The average number of vehicles per firm i s  2.7 i n  South 
Shoreditch (excluding firm 42) and 6.4 i n  Brimsdown. The numbers per 
firm are  more a function of operational requirements than s i z e  of firm. 
Three clothing firms i n  South Shoreditch do not own any commercial 
vehicles,  and somewhat suprisingly a Brimsdown d is t r ibu t ion  firm (61) 
has no vehioles. 
(ii) The number and proportion of type D and E vehicles based a t  firms 
i n  both study areas are  extremely low, but par t icu la r ly  so i n  South 
Shoreditch where there  i s  a predominance of t h e  small type A and B 
vehicles. 
(iii) Only one firm i n  each study area has type D or  E vehicles 
based on t h e i r  premises: 
South Shoreditch No. 44 2 x Type E 
Brimsdown No. 47 7 x !L'ype D; 2 x Type E;  7 type D t r a i l e r s .  
Firm 44 i s  a small haul ier  employing 5 people, and sharing "under the  
arches" premises with another haulage firm of about t he  same s ize .  
Firm 47 i s  a l a rge  manufacturer of aluminium and copper products. 
It has a large warehouse.which forms an in tegra l  par t  of t h e  operations 
approximately 1; miles away from the  main works. 
( i v )  The proportions of type D and E vehicles i n  firms' f l e e t s  i n  
each study area a r e  considerably l e s s  than the  London average derived 
from the  1971 GLTS. Probably reasons include: 
- t he  majority of firms in t he  sample a r e  from manufacturing 
industr ies .  
- no la rge  service firms have been included i n  t he  sample. 
- major haul ie rs ,  nationalised industr ies ,  l a rge  d i s t r ibu tors  
and securi ty  firms a re  not included. 
- t h e  sample has been designed del iberate ly  t o  include small 
firms (although there  i s  no clear  re la t ionship between s i ze  
of firm and s i ze  of f l e e t ) .  
( v )  There a r e  no immediately apparent reasons f o r  t h e  greater  number 
of vehicles per firm i n  Brimsdown, but it i s  par t ly  due t o  greater  
f l e e t  numbers of th ree  of the  Brimsdown dis t r ibutors .  
( v i )  There i s  a preference for  smaller vehicle s i z e  i n  South 
Shoreditch. While t h i s  i s  par t ly  f o r  operational reasons (because of 
the  nature of the  firms' a c t i v i t y ) ,  t he  fac t  t h a t  proportionally more 
t r i p s  a r e  made by South Shoreditch firms' vehicles i n  t h e  congested 
conditions of cen t ra l  and inner London may be a contributing factor.  
( v i i )  The management of f ive  firms s ta ted  tha t  t he  vehicles which they 
operated were not,  i n  t h e i r  opinion, of optimum size .  The de t a i l s  are  
shown i n  Table 3. 
Table 3. NON-OPTIm; VEHICLE FLEETS 
Firm 
-
SIC 
- Emptt Existing Comment* 
Fleet  
SHOREDITCH 
26 12 140 1B, 1 C  Height r e s t r i c t i on  a t  
entrance t o  works. Larger 
vehicles would help 
dispatches. 
BRIMSDOWN 
47 6 ca.600 1B,7C,7D,2E Larger vehicles would help 
d i s t r ibu t ion  schedules, but 
cannot be accepted on 
premises of some customers 
A greater  number of 
smaller vehihles would 
give more f l e x i b i l i t y  i n  
vehicle scheduling. 
Larger vehicles would 
r e su l t  i n  fewer dispatch 
t r i p s  being required. 
Larger vehicles would 
r e s u l t  i n  fewer dispatch 
t r i p s ,  however customer 
requirements determine 
d is t r ibu t ion  frequency i n  
any case. 
* Comments provided by management 
** Function is mainly dis t r ibut ion.  
2.4 VEHICLE MOVE3ENTS 
Each f i r m  was surveyed during i t s  normal working day (usually ca. 0730- 
17.00). Table 4 gives t he  number of vehicle movements recorded and 
Table 5 indicates t he  type of vehicle. Data from the  GLTS and the  
Traffic Monitoring Review a re  provided for comparison. Appendix I1 
contains t he  number of movements a t  individual firms. 
Table 4. VEHICLE MOVEMENTS : NUMBERS OF VEHICLES 
South Shoreditch Brimsdown 
Number of commercial 
vehicles per  day 
(ca. 9 hours ) . 
< lo 6 
1 0  - 19 1 0  
2 20 3 
- 
Total  19 firms 
1 2  
4 
3 
- 
19 firms 
Table 5. VEHICLE MOVEMENTS : COMPOSITION ( % )  
Vehicle South Brimsdown Stops in** Traff ic  composition*** type  ( 8 )  Shoreditch* London a r e a  Inner Outer 
areas  
-
areas 
-
A 23.4 6.9 
B 34.1 17.0 A+B> 54.7 A+B> 53.8 A+B) 48.9 
D 2.4 14.4 8.3 
7.4 4.2 D+E> 12.5 D+El 17.4 E 1.8 
Total  100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
H Excluding t r i p s  by "roundsman" vehic les  a t  f i r m  42 
** 1971 GLTS d a t a  repor ted  i n  TRRL SR 465 
*** GLC T r a f f i c  Monitoring Review and TSN 277, 1980 data.  
Table 6 lists those firms a t  which type D or E vehicle t r i p s  were recorded, 
and Table 7 lists cha rac t e r i s t i c s  of those t r i p s .  
TABLE 6 - TYPE D and E VEHICLE MOVEMENTS* 
firm SIC 
- -
a c t i v i t y  emp't D t r i p s  E t r i p s  Total  
39 22 t ranspor t  11 1 1 2 
41 2 3 d i s t r i b u t ' n  30 1 1 
42 2 3 d i s t r i b u t ' n  51 l(1) l(1) 2 (2) 
43 23 d i s t r i b u t ' n  25 1 1 
44 2 2 t ranspor t  5 l(1) l(1) 
Total: South Shoreditch 4 (1) 3 (2) 7 (3) 
metal manuf. 
I t  
9 ,  
mech. eng. 
elect.eng. 
8 ,  ,, 
metal goods 
n.e.s. 
7 ,  ,I 
other  manuf. 
t ransport  
d i s t r i b u t ' n  
d i s t r i b u t ' n  
-- - - 
Total: Brimsdown 27(17) 14 (3)  41 (20) 
* numbers i n  brackets a re  numbers of these movements by company owned 
vehicles. 
TABLE 7 TYPE D and E TRIP CHARACTERISTICS (numbers of vehicles) 
Sth Shoreditch Brimsdown 
D E D E 
(A) Freq. of v i s i t s  > l/wk 2 1 4 2 
t o  site (excl.co. >l/mth 1 0 0 2 
owned vehs.) <l/mth 0 0 3 3 
1st v i s i t  0 0 2 4 
(B) % of time veh. 0-25% 0 0 4 10 
spends i n  London 26-50% 0 0 4 1 
(incl.co.vehs) 51-758 0 0 1 1 
76:100% 4 2 7 2 
(C) Trip purpose de l iver  2 1 7 11 
( i nc l  . co . vehs ) c o l l e c t  1 1 8 1 
both 1 1 6 2 
other  0 0 0 0 
(Dl No. of drops per journey 
- av., co.vehs. I' I' 2.1 2.7 
- av.,non-co.vehs.GLC based i 1.8 13.0 1.0 - av., non-co vehs. based 5. 6.0 3.2 elsewhere 
(*values fo r  the  4 t r i p s  recorded are  1, 7, 7 and 50).  
(E) Trips crossing GLC boundary 
( i )  Co-vehs. ** 
, - t r i p s  t o t a l l y  w i t h  GLC 1 1 13 2 
- t r i p s  crossing GLC bdry. 0 1 4 1 
(ii) Non co-vehs .*** 
- t r i p s  t o t a l l y  within GLC 1 1 1 1 
- t r i p s  crossing GLC bdry. 2 0 8+ lo++ 
** A l l  vehs. v i s i t i n g  S.S. and B'down are  based within GLC. 
*** El1 vehs. v i s i t i n g  S.S. a re  based within GLC. 
+ 6 t r i p s  by vehicles based outside GLC. 
++ 9 t r i p s  by vehicles based outside GLC. 
2.6 COMMENTS - VEHICLE MOVEMENTS 
( i )  The dai ly  commercial vehicle movements recorded a t  t he  firms are  
i n  broad agreement with generation r a t e s  suggested i n  t he  l i t e ra ture*  and 
variations are  explained by the  character is t ics  of operation of 
individual firms. Only i n  the  case of one Brimsdown d is t r ibu tor  
( f i r m  63) was the  re la t ive ly  low l eve l  of c m e r c i a l  vehicle ac t iv i ty  
d i f f i c u l t  t o  explain. 
( i i )  There were r e l a t i ve ly  few movements t o  and from South Shoreditch 
firms by type D and E vehicles. The 7 movements recorded involved 
only 5 firms a l l  i n  t he  service sectors. The proportion of movements 
(or  "stops") by type D and E vehicles (4.2%) i s  much l e s s  than for  
London as  a whole, 12.556, derived from 1971 GLTS. 
( i i i )  By contras t ,  21.8% of a l l  movements i n  Brimsdown were by type 
D and type E vehicles, somewhat i n  excess of t h e  London average. The 
27 t r i p s  by type D and 1 4  by type E involved a t o t a l  of 13 firms. 
( i v )  Excluding t h e  22 t r i p s  t o  and from Firm 47 (mostly by the  firm's 
own vehicles) the  proportion of type D and E movements recorded a t  
the  remaining 18 Brimsdown firms (12.1%) was i n  agreement with the 
London average. 
(v )  Differences i n  vehicle composition between study areas are  
par t ly  a re f lec t ion  of differences i n  f i r m s '  operations and products, 
differences i n  firms' own f l e e t  composition, differences i n  origins/  
destinations,  and may be due t o  the  f ac t  t ha t  vehicles t o  and from 
South Shoreditch spend a greater  proportion of t h e i r  time i n  cen t ra l  
and inner London. 
( v i )  About half  t he  D and E vehicle movements a r e  by firms' 
own vehicles, and the  majority of these t r i p s  a r e  within t he  GLC area. 
By contrast  most t r i p s  by non-firm vehicles cross t he  GLC boundary. 
About half  of t he  drivers of D and E vehicles spent more than 50% of 
t h e i r  driving time within London, and Table 7 suggests t ha t  many of 
the  drivers of non-firm vehicles v i s i t ed  the  firm regularly. 
* Which themselves cover l a rge  variations within each indus t r i a l  grouping 
07 sub-grouping. 
( v i i )  Table 7 a l so  suggests t ha t  large vehicles are  more important 
for  del iver ies  t o  firms than fo r  the dis t r ibut ion of t h e i r  output. 
( v i i i )  It should be noted t h a t  the surveys did not include any night 
time operations by those firms which worked sh i f t s .  These firms are  
l i s t e d  i n  Table 8. 
TABLE 8. FIRMS WOFKING A SHIFT-SYSTEM 
firm 
-
SIC 
-
a c t i v i t y  comment 
34 18 pr in t ing  e tc .  Although not  ascertained, night  del iver ies  
a r e  unlikely. 
35 18 p r in t ing  e tc .  Likely t o  be night de l iver ies  and collections 
of packets e tc .  i n  small vehicles* 
36 18 pr in t ing  e tc .  Likely t o  be night de l iver ies  and col lect ions 
of packets e t c .  i n  small vehicles* 
37 18 p r in t ing  e tc .  Although not ascertained, night  del iver ies  
a re  unlikely. 
42 2 3 d i s t r ibu t ion  Night del iver ies  t o  f i r n ~  probably i n  2 o r  
3 type C o r  D vehicles. Roundsman vehicles 
s t a r t  de l iver ies  ca. 0500. 
46 6 metal manufact. Although not ascertained, night  del iver ies  
are  unlikely. 
47 6 metal manufact. Not known i f  there are  night  del iver ies .  
55 12 metal goods 
n.e.s. No night del iver ies .  
57 16 br icks ,  g lass  etc.Although not  ascertained, niqht. del iver ies  
are  unlikely. 
58 19 o ther  manufact. No night del iver ies .  
..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ....- .. 
* type A or  E vehicles and not affected by proposed bans. 
( i )  There a r e  differences between study areas,  both i n  type of 
industry and vehicle ac t iv i ty .  The samples are  intended t o  represent 
conditions i n  inner and outer London. 
(ii) Few firms i n  South Shoreditch would be affected by 16 ton and 24 
ton GVW bans; over half  the  Brimsdown firms would be affected. 
(iii) The proportion of commercial vehicle t r i p s  affected i n  South 
Shoreditch would be low; i n  Brimsdown one i n  every f ive  comercia1 
vehicle t r i p s  would be affected. 
( i v )  Most firms have few movements by type D or  E vehicles i n  any 
one day; nevertheless t he  e f fec t s  of bans could be considerable i f  
these movements account f o r  a large proportion of ac t iv i ty . .  
( v )  The e f f ec t s  of the  bans on firms v i a  impacts on suppliers could 
be as  severe as t he  d i rec t  e f fec t  v i a  firms' own vehicle f l ee t s .  
While these broad implications can be drawn from the  previous study, 
it i s  necessary t o  obtain fur ther  information from firms i n  order t o  
determine the a l te rna t ives  which a re  open t o  firms i n  t he  event of a 
ban, those which they would consider, and the  resu l t ing  costs.  
3. FURTHER SURVEYS: OBJECTIVES AND METHOD 
3.1 The r e su l t s  of Section 2 indicate  t he  extent t o  which manufacturing and 
service firms own and make use of heavy commercial vehicles,  and 
r e l a t e  t h i s  t o  t h e i r  t o t a l  commercial vehicle ac t iv i ty .  Although the 
number of heavy commercial vehicle movements recorded a t  many firms 
was low, par t icu la r ly  i n  t he  inner study area, t he  imposition of 
the  proposed bans could nevertheless require considerable adjustment 
t o  vehicle f l e e t  composition, vehicle scheduling, and operating 
practices.  
In  order t o  evaluate these l i k e l y  e f fec t s  it was necessary t o  obtain 
more detai led information from the firms themselves. The r e s u l t s  i n  
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Section 2 were used as  t he  basis  for  identifying a s h o r t l i s t  
of those firms l i ke ly  t o  be most affected by the  bans, and on which 
analysis of implications and costs  could be concentrated. The main 
c r i t e r i a  for  select ing these firms were: 
( i )  they should have control  over t he  commercial vehicles used; 
(ii) t ransport  should c lear ly  be an important par t  of t h e i r  overal l  
operations ; and 
( i i i )  t h e i r  ex is t ing  transport  operations should be dependent on 
the  use of commercial vehicles i n  excess of 1 6  tons GVW. 
The c r i t e r i a  suggested t h a t  the  following f i m s  warranted fur ther  
study: 
South Shoreditch: Firms 42 and 44 
Brimsdown : firms 47 and 64. 
These four firms were approached t o  provide detai led information on 
t h e i r  transport  operations, and there  was a posi t ive  response from 
three of them. The fourth, firm 42, was par t  of a l a rger  group 
which had already made a submission t o  t he  Inquiry. 
3.2 A semi-structured interview with management was designed t o  provide 
information t o  evaluate t h e  effects  of the  following bans: 
( i )  A 24 hour ban on vehicles i n  excess of 24 tons GVW 
( i i )  A 24 hour ban on vehicles i n  excess of 16 tons GVW 
( i i i )  Night time bans for  24 tons and 16 tons GVW vehicles 
( i v )  Weekend bans for  24 tons md 16 tons GVW vehicles  
This required a detai led description of t he  firm's d i s t r ibu t ion  
system, of which the  main items were: 
(i) Major or igins  and destinations,  and commodity descriptions. 
(ii) Associated branches, depots etc.  
( i i i )  Distribution pat terns  including vehicle numbers and type,  
numbers of t r i p s ,  numbers of drops, load fac tors  by weight and 
volume. 
( i v )  Objectives of t he  firm's transport  operations, including 
leve l  of service_.objectives or  requirements, and constraints.  
(v )  Costing information ( such as vehicle depreciation policy).  
As well  as  establishing as  comprehensive a pic ture  a s  possible of 
current a c t i v i t i e s ,  t he  interview sought management's views on t h e  
firm's most l i k e l y  reaction t o  t he  bans, and on t h e i r  preferred 
option from a range of possible options: 
(i) Use l i g h t e r  vehicles. 
( i i )  Use transshipment depots on t h e  edge of t he  GLC area. 
(iii ) Relocate affected operations. 
( i v )  Use an a l te rna t ive  mode ( r a i l ,  water). 
(v )  Cease affected operations. 
and i n  t he  case of nightlweekend controls: 
( v i )  Cease nightlweekend collections and del iver ies .  
Manwent was a l so  given the  opportunity t o  specify any other reaction 
which they thought feasible.  
3.3 The analysis concentrated on identifying those pa r t s  of the  firm's 
transport  a c t i v i t i e s  which would be affected by the bans, and t h e  
extent t o  which they would be affected. Importantly, t h e  cost  
implications were explored, and for  t h i s  a r e l a t i ve ly  simple reaction 
by f i r m s  t o  t h e  bans was adopted. It was assumed t h a t  firms would: 
( i )  continue exis t ing operations a t  t h e i r  present locat ions ,  
( i i )  change t o  l i g h t e r  vehicles,  and 
(iii) re-schedule if necessary. 
The cost estimates which have been prepared are  "snapshots" of before 
and a f t e r  annual operating costs.  I n  view of t he  costing information 
supplied by the  firms, t he  operating cost  t ab les  of Motor Transport 
( 7  April 1982) have been judged t o  be the  most appropriate of t he  
more readily available cost  sousces. They do, however, r e f e r  t o  
platform semi-trailers. While t h i s  is  sat isfactory f o r  firm 47, 
firms 4h and 64 operate box body t r a i l e r s ,  f o r  which operating costs  
would be of t h e  order of 5% greater  than for  f l a t s  of corresponding 
weights. 
It should be noted tha t  i n  considering the  costings it has been assumed 
tha t  t he  bans r e f e r  only t o  gross vehicle weight, and there  are  no 
changes t o  t h e  ex is t ing  regulations governing vehicle dimensions. 
This assumption has important cost implications f o r  a l l  three  firms. 
It has a l so  been assumed t h a t  t he  change-over t o  smaller vehicles 
would be f r i c t i on le s s ,  and t h a t  the  introduction of t h e  bans would 
not temporarily d i s t o r t  t h e  market e i ther  for  firms' proaucts or f o r  
vehicles. 
3.4 As with the  e a r l i e r  surveys of firms the enthusiasm of management, and 
the  qual i ty  of t h e  data which they supplied, var ied between f i r m s .  
Firm 64 was well informed and closely monitored t h e i r  t ransport  
operations. This was much l e s s  t he  case with firm 44, for which 
consignment data and load fac tors  were f a r  from adequate. The 
responsibi l i ty  f o r  firm 47's transport  operations was fragnented as  
the  resu l t  of recent s t a f f  ra t ional isat ion and cost-reducing in i t i a t i ves .  
No s ingle  member of the  management s t a f f  had e i the r  a c lear  pic ture  of ,  
o r  responsibi l i ty  for ,  transport  operations. Consequently the  amount 
and qual i ty  of data and opinions which t h i s  firm was able t o  provide 
was somewhat l e s s  than hoped for .  
Of t he  four firms approached for  detai led information, firms 42 and 
64 were well  acquainted with t he  current Inquiry and t h e  proposed 
bans, firm 44 had only vague knowledge and had not considered the  
implications were the bans t o  be imposed, and firm 47 had not heard 
of the  proposals and the work of the  Inquiry. 
3.5 The dis t r ibut ion and scheduling arrangements of firms 44 and 64 a re  
based on predictable and repe t i t ive  24 how cycles which were adequately 
described by management. Vehicle scheduling a t  firm 47 i s  much 
l e s s  predictable because of factory input and output requirements 
and because of customers' needs. For t h i s  firm, detai led vehicle 
records covering a l l  movements over a one week period were obtained. 
3.6 The case studies of Sections 4,  5 and 6 s m a r i s e  each firm's overal l  
operations, describe t h e i r  transport  ac t iv i ty ,  consider management's 
anticipated reaction t o  t he  .. bans, assess t he  l i ke ly  implications, 
and make r e l a t i ve ly  straightforward cost estimates of adjustments 
which could be required i n  response t o  t he  bans. 
h .  CASE STUDY 1: FIRM 44 (South Shoreditch) 
4.1 BACKGROUND 
SIC : 22 Transport and Communications 
Hire and reward. 
Operations/activity: Road haulage involving trunk movements of b u i l t  
up consignments i n to  and out of London and surrounding area,  and loca l  
d i s t r ibu t ion  of broken down loads. There i s  no warehousing or  storage. 
Administration: The firm i s  part  of a l a rger  haulage group. The 
operations a t  t h e  South Shoreditch depot are  largely independent of 
t he  a c t i v i t i e s  of other members of t he  group, however major decisions 
on depot functions, scheduling, and vehicle acquisit ion and u t i l i s a t i on  
are  taken elsewhere. Much of the  firm's bookkeeping is  also carr ied 
out elsewhere. 
Employment: Total employment i s  1 4 ,  t h e  majority of whom a re  drivers.  
Commodities: General merchandise from parcel  s i z e  t o  ton pa l l e t s ;  
no incompatible or  special ised comodities.  
4.2 TRANSPORT ACTIVITY 
4.2.1 Transport ac t iv i ty  can be divided in to  3 elements. 
i) trunk haul t o  Lancashire/Yorkshire depots for  dis t r ibut ion 
t o  locat ions  elsewhere i n  t he  U.K. 
ii) l oca l  collections and del iver ies  associated with trunk 
haul. 
iii) other l oca l  collections and del iver ies .  
1 Trunk haul is carr ied out using 32 t GVW, 40' t r a i l e r  ( type E ) 
box body a r t i c s .  Most l o c a l  collection and delivery is  by type C 
1 -. . 
Refer t o  Appendix I f o r  vehicle c lass i f ica t ion .  
vehicles (7;-16 ton  GVW) box body r ig ids ,  although occasionally trunk 
haul vehicles m a y  be used f o r  ( i i )  aboue. 
The vehicle f l e e t  based a t  South Shoreditch consists of:  
2 x type B 
5 x type C 
2 x type E (32 t GVW, 40' box body, 2500 cuf't ) 
During periods of high ac t iv i ty  the  f i r m  can draw on other vehicles 
operated by the  group. 
1,2. 4.2.2 The typ ica l  24 hour trunk haul cycle operates as follows . 
i )  By 1900 there  a r e  2 loaded 32 ton GVW t r a i l e r s  ( A  & B) 
ready t o  be sent t o  s an cash ire. A t  t he  same time, there  
a r e ,  a t  Lancashire, 2 loaded 32 ton GVW t r a i l e r s  ( C  & D) 
ready t o  be sent t o  South Shoreditch. 
ii) There are  a t o t a l  of two t r ac to r  un i t s  involved i n  t he  
operation, one or iginal ly  a t  South Shoreditch and t h e  other 
a t  Lancashire. 
i i i )  A t  2000 t h e  Sauth Shoreditch t r ac to r  takes t r a i l e r  A t o  the  
Toddington service area on the  MI, where the dr iver  meets 
t r a i l e r  C from Lancashire. Drivers exchange vehicles, and 
t r a i l e r  C i s  driven t o  South Shoreditch. 
i v )  Tra i le r  C i s  dropped a t  a secure depot i n  South Shoreditch, 
and the  dr iver  returns t o  Toddington with t r a i l e r  B. 
v )  Drivers.,exchange vehicles and the  South Shoreditch dr iver  
returns t o  South Shoreditch with t r a i l e r  D. 
v i )  These operations a r e  completed by 0500-0530, and t r a i l e r s  
C and D are  l e f t  for  unloading by the  day s t a f f ,  who a r r ive  
a t  0730. 
P 
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This simplifies the  operations t o  t he  extent t h a t  some on-movement i n t o  
Kent i s  ignored, as  i s  the-use of a secure l o r ry  park i n  South Shoreditch 
(approx. 1 mile from f i r m  no. 44's s i t e )  used t o  s tore  t r a i l e r s  during 
the  shut t le  operations between South Shoredtich and Toddington. 
Neither i s  l i ke ly  t o  effect  re-scheduling. 
There are  three &ivers involved, one based a t  South Shoreditch and 
two a t  Lancashire. 
v i i )  T ra i l e r s  C and D a re  unloaded and the goods dis t r ibuted 
loca l ly  by type C vehicles. Consignments collected by type 
C vehicles during t h e  day are  loaded i n t o  t r a i l e r s  C and D. 
By 1900 t h i s  loading i s  complete and t r a i l e r s  C and D are  
ready for  dispatch t o  Lancashire. 
4.2.3 Approximately 100-120 individual consignments a r e  col lected i n  t h e  
London area for  dispatch north i n  the  evening. Consignment type, s i ze  
and weight i s  not predictable ( there  are  no s ignif icant  long term 
contractual arrangements), however they consist  of d iv i s ib le  loads 
of general merchandise. The number of a r t i c l e s  per consignment can 
vary from 1 t o  30, and the  consignment weight from 251b t o  10001bs. 
A 24 hour service i s  provided t o  customers, usually by phone, 
throughout t he  day. Typically it was estimated t h a t  of t h e  2 vehicles 
dispatched north each evening, one i s  f u l l y  loaded and the other i s  
approximately half  full (by volume). Total  consignment weight was 
seldom a constra int ,  and there  were no capacity problems. It was 
usual for  both vehicles arr iving each morning from Lancashire t o  be 
f u l l y  loaded (again by volume). It was not possible t o  obtain detai led 
consignment information. 
4.3 MANAGEMENT'S ANTICIPATED REACTIONS TO PROPOSED BANS 
4.3.1 24 ton; 24 hour Ban 
Management was unable t o  estimate t h e i r  react ion t o  t he  proposed bans 
although they considered t h a t  t he  40 foot t r a i l e r s  could s t i l l  operate 
from t h e i r  depot i n  South Shoreditch since they were loaded t o  
capacity by volume ra ther  than weight. It is d i f f i cu l t  t o  ver i fy  t h i s  
without the  necessary information on t o t a l  consignment weights. 
However, it appears f romthe scanty evidence obtained t h a t  loads per 
vehicle a r e  l i ke ly  t o  be around 10 t o  11 tons with maxima of 1 5  t o  16 
tons a remote poss ib i l i ty .  This would suggest t h a t  management are  
correct i n  assuming t h a t  24 t vehicles,  with a capacity of 16 t could 
be used, provided t h a t  t he  volumetric capacity of a 40 foot t r a i l e r  
was s t i l l  available.  No explanation was given for t h e  use of 32 t 
ra ther  than 24 t vehicLes currently,  and it may be t h a t  there  would 
be hidden costs ,  fo r  example i n  l o s t  compatibility with other a c t i v i t i e s  
i n  t he  group, from a t ransfer .  
4.3.2 16 ton; 24 hour  an 
Again, management estimated tha t  they could continue t o  use 40 foot 
t r a i l e r s .  This option seems l e s s  l i ke ly ,  since maximum loads may 
well occasionally exceed the  11 ton carrying capacity of 1 6  t 
vehicles, and 16 t t r ac to r s  a r e  somewhat underpowered for  use with 
40 foot t r a i l e r s .  It seems much more l i k e l y  t h a t  there  would be a 
switch t o  a t o t a l  of s i x  16 ton GVW two axle r i g i d  vehicles,  th ree  
based a t  South Shoreditch and three a t  Lancashire. This would 
provide both weight and volume capacity f o r  t he  exis t ing nightly 
dispatches f r o m  both South Shoreditch and Lancashire. The implications 
of these changes t o  scheduling arrangements and operating costs are  
discussed below. 
4.3.3 Other Bans 
Since the trunk haul operations take place a t  night,  a 16 t night 
time ban would impose the  same costs as  a 1 6  t 24 hour ban. A 
weekend only ban would not a f fec t  operations. 
4.4 IMPLICATIONS AND APPROXIMATE COSTINGS 
It i s  assumed t h a t  under t he  16 ton GVW ban t h e  f i r m  maintains 
exis t ing leve ls  of service with overnight del iver ies  t o  and from 
South Shoreditch and Lancashire. This requires three 1 6  ton GVW two 
axle r ig ids  t o  be loaded and ready f o r  dispatch a t  South Shoreditch 
and a t  Lancashire each evening. Within t h e  constraints of driving 
hours and dr ivers '  working days, t he  most cost-effective rescheduling 
s t i l l  makes use of dr iver  changeovers a t  t he  Toddington service 
area on the MI. There a r e  a t o t a l  of four drivers,  th ree  based a t  
Lancashire and one a t  South Shoreditch. The South Shoreditch based 
driver del ivers  each of t he  vehicles leaving London t o  Toddington, 
hands it over t o  a Laniashire based driver who has brought a vehicle 
down from Lancashire, and returns t o  South Shoreditch with t he  vehicle 
from Lancashire. Be repeats t h i s  three times during t h e  night. 
!Che f i r s t  Lancashire dr iver  returns t o  base with t h e  f i r s t  o f t h e  
vehicles from London. He is  then near t he  l imi t  of driving hours 
and ceases work. The pattern i s  repeated by a fur ther  two Lancashire 
based drivers.  
Scheduling arrangements can be summarised as: 
- 
t r ac to r s  t r a i l o r s  r ig ids  drivers 
Existing operations 2 4 - 3 
24 ton GVW ban 2 4 - 3 
16 ton GVW ban - - 6 4 
4.4.2 Approximate costs of exis t ing and rescheduled operations 
Using readily available costing information it i s  d i f f i cu l t  t o  
separate unambiguously t h e  standing costs  of a t r a i l e r  from t h a t  of 
a t r ac to r - t r a i l e r  combination. Consequently a range of t r a i l e r  
standing costs of 0-25% t h a t  of a combination have been examined. 
Similarly t he  fu l l  cost of employing the  t h i r d  dr iver  i s  d i f f i cu l t  
t o  es tabl ish but it has been assumed t o  be simply wages and National 
Insurance, with no contribution t o  fixed establishment costs.  The 
remaining costs are  equivalent t o  two t r ac to r - t r a i l e r  combinations 
or  th ree  r ig ids  each making a return London-Lancashire t r i p  per day. 
The same costing method has been used i n  t he  case of a 24 ton GVW 
ban, since similar numbers of vehicles and drivers a r e  required, and 
the  scheduling arrangements remain unaltered. Costing the  revised 
operations under a 16 ton GVW ban is r e l a t i ve ly  straightforward 
provided t h a t  t he  same assumptions a r e  made regarding the  cost  of 
drivers.  
Total annual operating costs  based on Motor Transport Cost Tables 
for  exis t ing and revised operations are  summarized below. 
Annual Operating Costs (E) 
standing: running total 
Existing operations 47800-53480 78880 126680-132360 
24 ton GVW ban 39700-44050 58320 98020-102370 
16 ton GVW ban 74510 79800 154310 
Taking the high estimates for  the  a r t icu la ted  costings, t he  24 ton GW 
ban could conceivably resu l t  i n  an annudl cost saving on trunk 
haul operations of £29,990 ( i . e .  22.7%) compared with current 
operations. It is not possible t o  assess the  extent t o  which t h e  
change t o  24 ton GVW vehicles would a f fec t  t he  other operations of 
the  group, and possibly impose costs elsewhere. A 16 ton GVW ban 
would lead  t o  an annual cost increase of between £27,630 and £21,950 
(21.8% and 16.6%. respect ively) .  
4.5 SUMMARY 
( i )  Trunk haul operations would be affected by a 16 ton 24 hour 
or  night time ban. 
(ii) Management thought t h a t  they would be unaffected by the  16 ton 
ban, since they could s t i l l  use 40 foot t r a i l e r s  but ,  as noted 
above, t h i s  seems unlikely. 
(iii) It appears t h a t  management would make savings of around 20% 
by using 24 ton 40 foot t r a i l e r  vehicles, but there  may be 
other reasons for  using 32 ton vehicles which were not made 
apparent t o  us. 
( i v )  Weekend bans would not affect  t he  firm. 
(v)  The most l i k e l y  response t o  a 16 ton ban would appear t o  be 
t o  use 16 ton r ig ids ;  t h i s  would add between 15% and 20% 
t o  annual trunk haul operating costs ,  and require rescheduling 
of t he  24 hour trunking cycle. 
( v i )  the  effects  of t h i s  on the firm's competitiveness a r e  not 
c lear  but it i s  important t o  note t ha t  t he  trunk haul i s  
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t he  main service which it provides. 
5. CASE STUDY 2: FIRM 47 (Brimsdown) 
5.1 BACKGROUND 
SIC : 6 Metal manufacture 
Operations/activity: Production of aluminium and copper product 
pr incipal ly  extrusions, bars ,  tubes and wire. Act iv i t i es  a t  
Brimsdown include production/manufacture, warehousing, d i s t r ibu t ion  
as well as  administration. There i s  a warehousing depot integrated 
with t he  Brimsdown operations located 1 4  miles may a t  Ponders End 
(referred t o  as  M3), and another production branch from which 
materials are  obtained located at Doncaster. The Brimsdown plant  
operates on a 24 hour basis .  
Administration: The firm i s  par t  of a l a rger  group but operates 
independently. 
Employment: Total employment was around 600 a t  t h e  time of t he  1980 
survey, but has been reduced considerably since then. 
Commodities: There are  two main groups of commodities (i) aluminium 
extrusions, fo r  which length i s  often the  important transport  factor ,  
and ( i i )  copper or  aluminium wire. This i s  produced a s  drums 
commonly of 2-1 ton weight, but drums of up t o  4 tons  may be 
produced a t  times. The extrusion and wire operations a r e  la rge ly  
tndependent of each other. 
5.2 TRANSPORT ACTIVITY 
5.2.1 There are  three main groups of commodity movements: 
( i )  delivery of supplies t o  No. 1 wire plant and No. 2 extrusion 
plant;  80% of these a r e  by suppliers '  vehicles. 
(ii) a shut t le  of intermediate and finished products and s tores  
between No. 1 or  No. 2 plant and the  M 3  warehouse, a l l  by 
firms' own vehicles. 
(iii) del iver ies  of wire output d i rec t  from No. 1 plant,  and 
aluminium extrusions from M 3  warehouse t o  al l  pa r t s  of t he  
UK; 90% of these t r i p s  are  by firms' own vehicles. 
Deliveries of wire products a r e  usually weight constrained 
and of extrusions dimension constrained. Contract hauliers 
may occasionally be used for  t h e  more d i f f i c u l t  loads. 
5.2.2 The firm's vehicle f l e e t  has been reduced s ignif icant ly  since 1980, 
and now consis ts  of: 
( i )  1 x 32 ton  GVW a r t i c  (type E) 
(ii) 3 x 19 ton GVW a r t i c  ( type D )  
( i i i )  2 x 16 ton GVW a r t i c  ( type D )  
( i v )  1 x 16 ton r i g i d  (type C )  
(v)  5 x 12; ton r i g i d  (type C )  
Vehicles ( i ) ,  ( i i )  and ( i v )  a r e  used f o r  wire products; ( i i i )  and 
( v )  f o r  extrusions. 
5.2.3 There is  no regular pat tern t o  the week's movements, and unfortunately 
t he  data col lected by the firm for  a week's movements was incomplete. 
However, it appears t h a t  i n  the  week i n  question the  vehicles were 
used as  follows (although where there  i s  more than one vehicle,  
movements cannot be a t t r ibu ted  re l iab ly  t o  specif ic  vehicles):-  
32 T B/hm M3(l) * Swansea M/cstr Norwich - 
11 T ? T 16; T 17 T 20 T 
Wire Alminium Wire Wire Wire - 
19 T ( A )  Leeds Leeds Leeds - Local 
9; T 8; T 9 T 2 T 
Wire Aluminium Wire Wire 
+ 
Wire 
~ 3 ( 3 ) *  M3(4)* M3(3)* M3(4)* Essex M3(5)* 
? T ? T ? T ? T 2 T ? T 
-Al/Stores Al/Stores Allstores Al/Stores Wire &/Stores 
1 9  T ( C )  Local - - - - - 
4 T 
Wire 
The two 16 t a r t i c s ,  the  16 t r i g id  and four of t he  f i ve  122 t 
r ig ids  appear t o  be f u l l y  used on most days. The f i f t h  122 t 
r i g i d  serves as a spare. 
5.3 MANAGEMENT'S ANTICIPATED RFACTIONS TO PROPOSED BANS 
5.3.1 24 ton; 24 hour Ban 
lulanagement was not able t o  specify how they would react  t o  t he  bans 
but considered t h a t  for  wire products they would require more smaller 
vehicles. Since the various products were compatible and individual 
drums usually l e s s  than 2 tons ,  t he  main d i f f i c u l t i e s  and costs  were 
seen as increased numbers of vehicles required, increased mileage 
and scheduling &iff  i c u l t i e s  t o  meet customer, requirements and ( i n  1 
t he  case of exports)  shipping times. I 
* 
Figures i n  brackets indicate  numbers of one way t r i p s ;  weights were 
unfortunately not recorded. 
-. . 
? T Indicates t ha t  weight was not recorded. I 
5.3.2 1 6  ton; 24 hour Ban 
The posit ion would be as  for  t h e  24 ton ban, but four ra ther  than 
one vehicle would be affected.  
5.3.3 Other Bans 
Although the  production plant operated 24 hours per day, there  was 
l i t t l e  vehicle a c t i v i t y  during the evenings. A night ban from 
2200-0600 would have v i r tua l ly  no effect .  Because the  firm attempted 
t o  dispatch consignments f o r  t he  London and S.E. area between 0600 
and 0800 ( t o  avoid congestion), and because occasionally there  were 
vehicles returning l a t e  i n  t he  evening, a night ban extending from 
2000-0800 would have a noticeable effect  on vehicle scheduling. 
The firm works a t  reduced capacity during the  weekends. Although 
there  are  no del iver ies  of t he  firm's outputs, o r  supplies/collections 
by other vehicles,  a shu t t l e  between the  main Brimsdown plant 
(NOS. 1 and 2)  and the  M 3  warehouse a t  Progress W a y  i s  maintained 
i n  order t o  supply raw materials for  production and t o  re turn t o  M3 
with waste/empties e tc .  On the Saturday for  which records were 
kept, there  were 5 t r i p s  by a r t i c  vehicles (awned by the  firm) i n  
excess of 16 tons  GVW, plus 2 t r i p s  by r ig ids  l e s s  than 16 tons GVW. 
In two of these t r i p s ,  loads of wire of 16 tons and 7;  tons 
respectively were involved, and two t r i p s  involved empty ree l s .  
Although c lear ly  these t r i p s  would be affected by a weekend ban, 
management did not estimate t he  implications and e f fec t  on vehicle 
scheduling, and production processes, and they appear t o  be minor. 
Management was a l so  concerned tha t  a size-based ban might be 
considered. They pointed out t ha t  some extrusions were commonly 23 
f e e t  long and occasionally 40 fee t  long. Production processes were 
based on these dimensions and would have t o  be ceased i f  vehicle 
controls were introduced which affected these lengths. 
5.4 IMPLICATIONS AND APPROXIMATE COSTINGS 
5.4.1 Scheduling under 24 ton GVW ban 
The one 32 ton  GVW vehicle would be affected by t h i s  ban and since 
it i s  used almost t o  capacity by weight on occasion it is  assumed 
t h a t  a t  l e a s t  t he  same capacity must be provided by replacements. 
The only apparent slack i n  t he  exist ing f l e e t  is t he  l i t t l e  used 
19 ton vehicle (C); it may be tha t  vehicle (B)  i s  a lso underused, 
but unfortunately load information i s  not available.  Two a l te rna t ive  
assumptions a r e  made: 
( i )  t ha t  t he  underused 19 ton vehicle can be used for  t he  majority 
of t he  32 ton vehicle 's  loads and tha t  another 16 ton vehicle 
i s  required for t he  remainder. This may be unrea l i s t ic  if 
t he  survey week had an unusually'low a c t i v i t y  level .  
(ii) t ha t  two 16 ton vehicles are required t o  replace the  32 ton  
vehicle. 
On the week i n  question t h e  32 ton vehicle t rave l led  1200 miles. 
Assuming t h a t  t h i s  i s  typ ica l ,  t he  annual costs  are:  
standing running t o t a l  
exis t ing operations 20360 23660 44020 
assumption (i) 14440* 30660 45100 
assumption (ii) 28880 31870 60750 
which represent an increase of between £1000 p.a. (2%) and £16000 p.a. 
( 38%) i n  annual operating costs  of t h i s  vehicle. 
5.4.2 Scheduling under 16 ton GVW ban 
With a 16 ton ban, it seems l i ke ly  t h a t  t he  32 ton vehicle would be 
replaced by tm 16 ton vehicles,  as i n  assumption ( i i )  above. For 
the  week i n  question, a l l  loads could have been car r ied  by 16 ton 
vehicles,  but it may be t h a t  on occasion the  19 ton vehicles are  
- - --- 
?4 
-. . 
Assumes t h a t  standing costs a r e  already met for  t he  1gT vehicle. 
used t o  t h e i r  capacity by weight. Two assumptions are  made therefore 
for  the  19 ton vehicles: 
( i )  t h a t  they can be replaced by the same number of 16 ton 
r ig ids  making the  same journeys 
( i i )  t h a t  for  t h e  week i n  question use of 16 ton r ig ids  would 
have involved an extra  journey t o  Leeds. 
It i s  d i f f i cu l t  t o  assess  the  likelihood of these or  other assumptions 
given the  lack of information and the  presence of a considerably 
underused vehicle. It i s  c lear  however t h a t  t h e  short  journeys t o  
M 3  a re  unlikely t o  a f f ec t  t he  calculations s ign i f ican t ly ,  even i f  
the vehicles concerned a re  currently used t o  capacity. 
On the weekend i n  question t h e  32 ton vehicle t rave l led  1200 miles 
and the  three 19 ton vehicles t rave l led  1400 miles. Assuming t h a t  
t h i s  i s  typ ica l ,  t h e  annual costs are  
standinq running t o t a l  
exis t ing operations 66260 40790 107050 
assumption ( i  ) 72180 50540 122780 
assumption ( i i )  72180 56750 128930 
which represent an increase of between f,16,000 (15%) and £22,000 
(20%) i n  annual operating costs  of these vehicles. 
5.5 SUMMARY 
(i) Some del iver ies  of wire products would be affected by a 24 ton 
24 hour ban; t h i s  would resu l t  i n  an increase i n  delivery 
costs  of between £1,000 and £16,000 p.a. 
( i i )  A l a rge r  proportion of wire del iver ies  and, possibly, some 
loca l  movements t o  t h e  depot, would be affected by a 16 ton 
24 hour ban; t h i s  would r e su l t  i n  an increase i n  delivery 
costs of between £16,000 and £22,000 p.a. 
( i i i )  In  both cases the  f i rm's  preferred option of a switch t o  
fewer vehicles has been assumed t o  be t h e  most l i ke ly  option; 
underuse of exis t ing vehicles reduces t he  extra  costs  of t h i s  
option somewhat. 
( i v )  A night time ban would have l i t t l e  e f fec t  on operations unless 
it were t o  continue u n t i l  0800, when severe scheduling 
problems would a r i se .  
(v )  A weekend ban would have a minor e f fec t  on movements t o  t he  
depot, but these could readily be accomodated by exis t ing 
smaller vehicles. 
( v i )  It i s  d i f f i c u l t  t o  assess the  wider effects  on the company of 
the  increases i n  cost i n  (i) and (ii) above; they might be 
expected t o  add 1% t o  4% t o  t he  costs  of cer ta in  wire products; 
t h i s  might a f fec t  t h e  firm's competitiveness. 
6. CASE STUDY 3: FIRM 64 (Brimsdown) 
S I C  : 23 Distr ibut ive trades.  
Operations/activity: Trunk haulage and loca l  d i s t r ibu t ion ,  ware- 
housing/storage, order assembly of two groups of commodities, 
confectionery and household paper products. The f i r s t  comodity 
group i s  under a r e l a t i ve ly  long standing contract ,  t h e  second has 
been more recently negotiated. Both contracts come up for  periodic 
renewal and a re  awarded by the  c l i en t s  t o  t he  most a t t r ac t ive  bidder. 
The firm has no i n t r i n s i c  competitive advantage i n  t h i s  process except 
i t s  experience and sat isfactory previous performance. 
Administration: The firm i s  par t  of a l a rger  group, although the 
operations from Brimsown are  independent of t h e  group's other 
ac t iv i t i e s .  
mployment: Total  employment is  39, of whom 15  are  drivers.  The 
remainder a r e  o f f i ce  and warehouse s t a f f .  
Commodities: There are  two groups of comodit ies .  Group 1 consists 
of confectionery items, f o r  t he  most par t  manufactured i n  Yorkshire. 
They are  order-assembled a t  Brimsdown for  d i s t r ibu t ion  t o  individual 
r e t a i l  out le ts .  Group 2 products are predominantly disposable 
children's  nappies, and also some associated paper products. They 
are  manufactured i n  France. 
6.2 TRANSPORT ACTIVITY 
6.2.1 Each group of commodities is  processed and handled separately. 
Group 1: i) Trunk haul delivery t o  Brimsdown depot from Sheffield.  
i i )  Local delivery t o  GLC and SE (bounded by Lowestoft, 
Oxford, Portsmouth). 
.. 
Group 2: i)  Trunk haul delivery t o  Brimsdown depot from France 
( v i a  Dover). 
ii) Distribution throughout the  U.K. 
I n  addition there  are  a number of other l e s s  regular del iver ies  of 
Group 1 commodities from other locations,  and on occasions t he  depot 
has been used for  temporary bulk storage of commodities associated 
with other aspects of t he  group's ac t iv i t i e s .  These are  not considered 
i n  t h i s  report .  
All  trunk haul operations use 32 t GVW (type E )  vehicles with 40 foot 
box t r a i l e r s .  Local dis t r ibut ion is almost en t i re ly  by vehicles 
below 16 t GW (type C vehicles) ,  of which about 1 4  a re  based a t  
Brimsdown. These vehicles make some 800 drops per week, with each 
vehicle usually making one delivery round per day. On occasions a 
32 t GVW vehicle is  added t o  t h i s  loca l  delivery f l e e t .  
The trunk haul vehicles of Group 1 commodities a r e  owned and operated 
by the  firm. Those of Group 2 are  not. 
Depots a t  Rugby and Br i s to l  a r e  involved i n  s imilar  operations 
regarding Group 1 commodities. 
6.2.2 For the  most par t  operations are  on a regular 24 hour cycle. 
Group 1: Two 32 t GVW, 40' vehicles,  f u l l y  loaded (by both weight 
and volume), a r r ive  from Sheffield between 0630 and 1030. 
The commodity i s  handled i n  supercube s t e e l  cages stacked 
two high i n  the  t r a i l e r .  The vehicles a r e  turned around 
i n  about an hour and return t o  Sheffield loaded with empty 
cages. The weight of individual consignments i n to  Brimsdown 
var ies  from 18 t o  21 tons. They are  stockpiled f D r  sub- 
sequent loca l  dis t r ibut ion.  
Group 2: Two 32 t GW 40' vehicles a r r ive  from France v i a  Dover each 
day, usually arr iving ca. 0800 (but dependent on f e r ry  
timetableg). These a r e  unloaded and return i n  2 hours. 
They a re  operated by Ferrymasters and are  backloaded before 
return t o  FrBnde. Details  of backloading a r e  not known. 
Vehicles arr iving a re  capacity loaded by volume. The t o t a l  
weight of each consignment is  usually 4-5 tons. 
Within each group, consignments a r e  d iv i s ib le  and there  are  no 
incompatible products. 
6.3 MANAGEMENT'S ANTICIPATED REACTIONS TO PROPOSED BANS 
6.3.1 24 ton; 24 hour Ban 
Management considered tha t  the  most cost-effective and eff ic ient  
solution would be t o  re locate  the  depot outside t h e  GLC, possibly t o  
t he  Reading area while re ta ining the  same functions and leve ls  of 
service t o  c l i e n t s  and t o  f i n a l  customers. Although t h i s  was the 
preferred option there  was reservation on two points. F i r s t l y  t h e  
depot had been recent ly  purpose modified and expanded for  i ts  current 
use. It was operated on a s a l e  and lease  back arrangement over 25 
years (with 5 yearly reviews) and there  was concern as t o  t he  cap i ta l  
cost  penalty associated with disposal of t he  Brimsdown s i t e  and 
acquisit ion of premises elsewhere. Secondly there  was concern t h a t  
s t a f f  would not move with t he  firm and there  would be d i f f i cu l t i e s  
recrui t ing su i tab le  new s t a f f .  
Use of a l a rger  f l e e t  of l i g h t e r  vehicles for  t h e  Sheffield trunk 
haul was a lso a feasible  option, but l e s s  a t t r ac t ive  because of t he  
increase i n  recurrent operating costs  compared with t he  one-off 
outlay involved i n  relocation. The use of l i g h t e r  vehicles would 
lead t o  increased costs of operating more vehicles (and dr ivers )  over 
the  same route s ince there  would be no opportunity t o  achieve 
economies through trunk haul rescheduling or redis t r ibut ion.  Local 
dis t r ibut ion would be unaffected, and, apart  from the  increased 
number of drivers for  t he  trunk haul, there  would be no increase i n  
warehousing or s t a f f  costs. 
Other options were not thought t o  be viable. The cost and, par t icular ly ,  
time penalty associated with transshipment would be l i k e l y  t o  make 
the  operations uneconomical compared with favourably located 
competitors. Transshigment was par t icular ly  unattractive i n  view of 
t he  firm's present locat ion close t o  t he  GLC boundary. There were 
similar concerns with the use of r a i l  and i t s  a b i l i t y  t o  move and 
transship the  amount of goods required i n  t he  time required. Again, 
because of t h e  competitive nature of the business, any increase i n  
costs would not be able t o  be passed on. Under t h e  r a i l  option trunk 
vehicles and t h e i r  drivers would become redundant. To cease 
operations completely would have a detrimental e f fec t  on the  group's 
a c t i v i t i e s  elsewhere and would only be re luctant ly  contemplated. 
6.3.2 16 t GVW, 24 hour ban 
A 16 ton GVW ban would have similar implications t o  those described 
i n  6.3.1, except t ha t  a greater  number of l i gh t e r  vehicles would 
be required. 
6.3.3 Other bans 
Existing operations could be maintained under a night only ban, only 
there  would be a loss  of f l e x i b i l i t y  and some doubt t ha t  t he  Sheffield 
round t r i p  could be achieved within dr ivers '  hours constraints.  
The main d i f f i cu l ty  was seen a s  t he  increased t r a v e l  times caused by 
congestion co-incident with t he  ban ceasing i n  the  morning, since 
there  would be a concentration of HGV's entering the  GLC area a t  t ha t  
time. 
The firm was seldom involved i n  weekend work and would not be affected 
by a weekend ban. 
6.4.1 No attempt has been made t o  cost the  firm's preferred option of 
relocation. Approximate costs  for  use of smaller vehicles have been 
assessed for  24 ton and 16 ton bans. It has been assumed t h a t  only 
trunk haul of group 1 commodities i s  affected but it should be noted 
tha t  : 
( i )  32 ton GVW vehicles are  used for  l oca l  delivery of Group 1 
goods 
-. 
( i i )  there  are  from time t o  time, other t r i p s  t o  t he  Brimsdown depot 
by HGV's i n  excess of 1 6  and 24 ton GVW 
(iii) the  current d i s t r ibu t ion  of t o t a l  vehicle operating costs of 
the  whole f l e e t  between trunk haul and l o c a l  d i s t r ibu t ion  i s  
not known 
( i v )  the  firm i t s e l f  does not have responsibi l i ty  f o r  scheduling 
of del iver ies  of Group 2 commodities, and therefore detai led 
estimates of t he  e f fec t s  of the  bans have not been assessed. 
The Group 2 commodities a r e  volume constrained. A 24 ton GVW ban 
would not require an increase i n  the  number of vehicles delivering t o  
the  f i r m ,  provided t h a t  exis t ing vehicle dimension regulations were 
unaltered. Although a change from 32 ton t o  24 ton GVW vehicles 
for  these del iver ies  implies an operating cost saving f o r  t h e  contract 
haul ier  ( ~ e r r y a a s t e r s ) ,  there  may well be implications for  back- 
loading of these vehicles. It has not been possible t o  estimate 
whether there  would be any knock-on effects  on un i t  r a t e s  chaxgedto 
f i r m  44. A 16 ton GVW ban, on the  other hand, would most l i ke ly  
require a change t o  three 16 ton GVW two axle r i g i d  vehicles i n  
order t o  maintain t he  exis t ing volume of del iver ies .  In t h i s  case 
t he  contractor would be faced with au operating cost  increase for  
t h i s  par t  of h i s  operations. Approximate costings s ~ g e s t  t he  
following annual operating costs for trunk haul of Group 2 commodities: 
exis t ing operations (2  vehicles) £93,000 
24 ton GVW ban ( 2  vehicles) £72,000 
16 ton GVW ban ( 3  vehicles) £97,000. 
6.4.2 24 ton  GW ban 
To move the present 42 ton payload of Group 1 goods from Sheffield 
would require 3 vehicles on t h e  l i m i t  of t he  ban, instead of t he  2 
vehicles used a t  present. Based on current Motor Transport Cost 
Tables, t h i s  would mean an increase i n  t o t a l  annual operating costs,  
excluding p ro f i t  allowance, from £93,300 t o  £107,900. The increase, 
£14,600, represents a 15.6% increase i n  annual trunk haul operating 
costs. 
6.4.3 16 ton GVW ban 
-. . 
In t h i s  case four r i g i d  vehicles on the l i m i t  of t h e  ban would be 
required, and even then there  majr be d i f f i c u l t i e s  moving the  required 
payload. An additional,  smaller, vehicle could be required t o  
maintain t he  current 24 hour schedule, or  a l te rna t ive ly  f ive  16 ton 
vehicles with a rescheduling of t r i p s  t o  optimise vehicle u t i l i za t ion .  
On the  assumption t h a t  four 16 ton r i g i d  vehicles would be just  
adequate, t o t a l  trunk operating costs would increase annually from 
£93,300 t o  £128,700. The increase, £35,400, represents a 37.9% 
increase i n  annual trunk haul operating costs. The extent t o  which 
the change t o  r i g i d  vehicles reduces t he  f l e x i b i l i t y  of operation of 
the  group has not been assessed. 
( i)  Trunk haul of Group 1 goods would be seriously affected both 
24 ton and 16 ton 24 hour bans. Trunk haul of Group 2 would 
also be affected, and there  may be some d i f f i cu l t i e s  t o  
l oca l  d i s t r ibu t ion  of Group 1 goods. 
( i i )  Night time and weekend bans would not seriously a f fec t  t h e  
firm. 
(iii) Under the bans, t he  firm's preferred option would be t o  
relocate.  
( i v )  To remain a t  i t s  present locat ion and continue exis t ing 
operations and l eve l s  of service would require a rihange t o  
a l a rge r  f l e e t  of smaller vehicles fo r  trunk haulage of 
Group 1 goods. For t h i s  operation there  would be the  - 
following operating cost  increases: 
24 ton ban: £14,600 (15.6% increase) 
16 ton ban: £35,400 (37.9% increase) 
These represent increases of approximately £1.25 and £2.55 per 
supercage, or  0.5p and 1 . 0 2 ~  per carton of confectionery. 
(v )  The e f fec t  of these increases on the  firm's competitive 
posit ion i s  not c lear .  
7. CONCLUSIONS 
7.1 Analysis of 38 representative manufacturing and service industry firms 
i n  South Shoreditch and Brimsdown suggests t h a t  any of t h e  bans 
being considered would only have a d i rec t  e f fec t  on firms'  vehicle 
f l e e t s  f o r  a very small proportion of manufacturing and service 
industry f irms . 
7.2 In  South Shoreditch, and possibly by extension i n  Inner London 
generally, t h e  bans would also have a small e f fec t  on t o t a l  commercial 
vehicle movements; a 24 ton ban would affect  2% of movements and 
one i n  s i x  of the  f i r m s  while a 16 ton ban would a f fec t  4% of move- 
ments and a quarter of t he  firms. There i s  some evidence t h a t  SoGh 
Shoreditch firms a r e  already forced by substandard infras t ructure  
t o  use suboptimal vehicles. 
7.3 I n  Brimsdown, by contras t ,  a 24 ton ban would affect  7% of movements 
and two firms i n  f ive ,  whlle a 16 ton ban would a f fec t  22% of movements 
and two th i rds  of the  firms. 
7.4 A majority of movements by vehicles of over 16  tons a r e  f o r  delivery 
t o  the  firm and a r e  not par t  of firms' own f l ee t s .  This suggests 
t ha t  bans are more l i ke ly  t o  affect  suppliers and firms' supplies, 
a t  l e a s t  f o r  manufacturing and service industry. 
7.5 The potent ia l  e f fec t s  of bans would clear ly  d i f fe r  considerably from 
firm t o  firm. To explore these var ia t ions  i n  more d e t a i l ,  case 
studies were conducted f o r  three firms par t icu la r ly  l i k e l y  t o  be 
affected. It was immediately noticeable t ha t  the  a b i l i t y  of management 
t o  predict t he  effects  of a ban varied considerably; i n  par t icu la r  
the  la rges t  firm concerned had some d i f f icu l ty  i n  providing de t a i l s  
of i t s  transport  a c t i v i t i e s  and was unaware of t he  proposed bans. 
7.6 In  all cases it was assumed tha t  only a weight-specific ban was 
proposed, and t h a t  a r t icu la ted  l o r r i e s  with 40 foot t r a i l e r s  would 
s t i l l  be able t o  operate provided tha t  they had a suf f ic ien t ly  low 
plated weight. It seems worth questioning t h i s  assumption, since 
there  i s  some evidence tha t  environmental in t rusion i s  perceived as 
being r e l a t ed  t o  s i ze  ra ther  than weight. It is a c ruc ia l  decision 
for  a l l  th ree  case study firms, however; a l l  had loads which were 
dimensionally constrained and one would have t o  abandon one of i t s  
two production processes if length were r e s t r i c t ed .  
7.7 One firm did not consider t ha t  it would need t o  reduce i ts  vehicle 
s izes  provided t h a t  i t s  vehicles could be down plated. However, it 
was apparent t h a t  a 16 ton ban would necessi ta te  smaller vehicles. 
Although one of t he  other firms gave relocation outside London a s  
its preferred option, both would be l i ke ly  t o  switch t o  vehicles a t  
t he  threshold of t he  ban. 
7.8 The effects  on the  three firms are  estimated as follows: 
firm: 44 47 64 
existing f l e e t  
of which type D 
type E 
24 t 24 hour ban 
vehicles affected o(l) 1 2 
addit ional cost (p.a. ) - 2 3 0 ~  (2 1 £1-E16K £l5K 
$ addition for  
vehicles affected -22% (2 )  2%-38% 16% 
16 t 24 hour ban 
vehicles affected 2 & 2 
addit ional cost (p.a. ) £22-E28K £16-E22K £35K 
% addition for  
vehicles affected 17%-22% 15%-20% 38% 
Notes : (1) Assuming t h a t  they can be downplated. 
(2 )  Assuming t h a t  t h e  f i r m  has no hidden benefits  from 
using 32 t ra ther  than 24 t vehicles. 
7.9 The percentage increa-s' i n  7.8 above a re  of dif ferent  proportions of 
t he  firm's t o t a l  t ransport  costs,  and therefore cannot be d i rec t ly  
compared. For f i r m  44 they are  an increase on the  main service 
(trunk haul)  provided. For firm 47 they could represent up t o  a 4% 
increase i n  t h e  costs  of cer ta in  wire products delivered t o  cer ta in  
locations.  For firm 64, they represent up t o  a 1% increase i n  t he  
costs of t h e  confectionery carried. It i s  d i f f i c u l t  t o  assess t he  
e f fec t s  of these costs on firms' competitixeness. 
7.10 The above cost  e s t ima te sas sme  tha t  uncosted e f f ec t s  a r e  unimportant. 
In  par t icu la r  it is worth bearing i n  mind 
( i )  t he  possible d i s tor t ion  of the  market f o r  firms' products 
during reorganisation of transport  arrangements; 
(ii) t he  possible e f fec t s  on the resa le  market of l a rge r  vehicles 
which would need t o  be traded in ;  
( i i i )  t he  possible need t o  r e t a in  Class I drivers who would be 
underemployed and, possibly, s t i l l  paid a t  Class I r a t e s ;  
( i v )  the  costs  t o  suppliers which may well be passed on t o  t he  
firms i n  question. 
7.11 The effects  of a night time ban would depend very much on i t s  
duration. Any night time ban would have the same effect  a s  a 24 
hour ban on firm 44. Bans from 2200 t o  0600 would be unlikely t o  
a f fec t  firms 47 and 64, but extension t o  2000 and, par t icu la r ly ,  t o  
0800 would have serious scheduling implications. 
7.12 None of t h e  th ree  firms would be s ignif icant ly  affected by a weekend 
ban. 
APPENDIX I . COMMERCIAL VEHICLE CLASSIFICATION 
The system of commercial vehicle c lass i f ica t ion  is  t ha t  adopted 
by the Freight Division of T.R.R.L.  f o r  studies of f re ight  transport .  
The vehicle types A t o  E correspond to :  
A = l i g h t  vans (car-based) 
B = two-axle goods vehicles (non HGV) 
C = two-axle goods vehicles (HGV'S i . e .  with rear  re f lec tor  
p la tes )  
D = three  axles ( r i g ids  g ~ d  a r t i c s )  
E = four o r  more axles ( r i g ids  and a r t i c s )  
Typical vehicles,  plated gross weight, and carrying capacity a r e  
shown below. The diagrams show only van bodies, but other body types 
such as platform, tanker e t c .  are  a lso included i n  t he  relevant 
category. 
TYPE OF VEHICLE 
APPENDIX 11. VEHICLE MOVEKENTS AT EACH FIRM (per day) 
firm SIC 
SOUTH SHOREDITCH 
- 
50 
140 
331 
n.a. 
25 
6 
34 
46 
12 
206 
72 
55 
107 
2 5 
11 
43 
30 
51 
25 
14 
total 
type D & E. 
m 'ments 
firm 
- 
45. 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
5 3 
54 
55 
56 
57 
55 
59 
60 
6 1 
62 
6 3 
64 
.. .... 
SIC emp't c.v.mlments 
- 
34 3 
342 2 1 
600 3 3 
100 11 
32 1 
42 2 
12 8 
58 7 
48 9 
n.a. n.a. 
42 5 
22 6 
60 3 
404 10 
216 17 
2 3 8 
22 5 
92 20 
56 6 
29 15 
- 
total 190** 
type D & E. 
m'ments 
1 
4 
22 
* (total includes 36 return trips) ** (total includes 13 return trips) 
n.a. = not available. 
